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Our Words, and Theirs: 




“C’est que la chimie avait le grand 
avantage de s’adresser à des réalités 




1. In his methodological reflections, posthumously published as Apologie pour 
l’histoire ou Métier d’historien (The Historian’s Craft) Marc Bloch remarked: “To the great 
despair of  historians, men fail to change their vocabulary every time they change 
their customs.”1 
The result of  this divergence is semantic ambiguity. Let us take a fundamental 
word in our intellectual and emotional vocabulary – ‘liberty’ whose manifold 
meanings have for a long time been at the very heart of  Bloch’s concerns. A closer 
look at them will cast some light over his ironically emphatic reference to historians’ 
“despair,” vis-à-vis the gap between the resilience of  words and their shifting meaning. 
Bloch mentioned “historians,” thinking of  himself: but his personal reactions had 
more distant, as well as more complex, roots. 
2. “History,” from the Greek historìa, is another word of  our vocabulary which, 
translated into various languages, remained the same along twenty-five centuries but 
changed its meaning.2 After being used by physicians, anatomists, botanists and 
antiquarians in a sense which included both ‘description’ and ‘inquiry,’ history has 
been referred almost exclusively to the realm of  human action – although a trace of  
its previous usage can be detected in expressions such as the “clinical history” of  a 
patient. This narrowing down of  its meaning is a side-effect of  a turning point which 
can, symbolically, be identified with this famous passage in Galileo’s Assayer: 
Philosophy is written in this vast book, which continuously lies open before our eyes 
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1 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 34; “Car, au grand désespoir des historiens, les hommes n’ont pas 
coutume, chaque fois qu’ils changent de mœurs, de changer de vocabulaire.” Bloch, “Apologie pour 
l’histoire”, 872. This passage has been brought again to my attention by Ciafaloni, “Le domande di 
Vittorio. Un ricordo di Vittorio Foa”, 42. 
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(I mean the universe). But it cannot be understood unless you have first learned to 
understand the language and recognize the characters in which it is written. It is 
written in the language of  mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and 
other geometrical figures. Without such means, it is impossible for us humans to 
understand a word of  it...3 
Galileo, notwithstanding his close connections with scientists committed to a 
non-mathematical approach to the study of  nature, announced that the language of  
nature is – or was bound to become – the language of  mathematics.4 On the 
contrary, the language of  history was, and has always been, from Herodotus’s time 
onwards, a human language: in fact, the language of  everyday life, even when it is 
supported by statistics and diagrams.5 But the evidence the historian relies upon is 
also mostly written in the language of  everyday life. 
Bloch reflected intensely on this contiguity, and its implications. “History receives 
its vocabulary” we read in another section of  his posthumous reflections “for the 
most part, from the very subject matter of  its study. It accepts it, already worn out 
and deformed by long usage; frequently, moreover, ambiguous from the very 
beginning, like any system of  expression which has not derived from the rigorously 
organized efforts of  technical experts.”6 Thus, historians are faced with two 
alternatives: either to echo the terminology used in their evidence, or to use a 
terminology which is foreign to it. The former alternative, Bloch remarks, leads 
nowhere: at times, the resilience of  intrinsically ambiguous words conceals the 
change in their meanings; at others, similar meanings are concealed by a multiplicity 
of  terms. We are left with the other alternative, which is risky: terms like ‘factory 
system,’ for instance, may seem to be a substitute for analysis, hence promoting 
“anachronism: the most unpardonable of  sins in a time-science.”7 Only scholarly 
exchanges, Bloch concludes, will ultimately lead to the construction of  a common 
vocabulary of  human sciences; but inventing new words is preferable to a tacit 
projection of  new meanings within commonly used terms.8 
Hence, a rigorous vocabulary may allow history to cope with its intrinsic weakness 
– the everyday language it shares with most of  its evidence. The reference to 
chemistry’s artificial terminology, which surfaces over and over again in Bloch’s 
pages, is telling enough: rarely had he been so close to positivism. But one of  
                                                 
3 Galilei, Il Saggiatore, 264: “... la filosofia è scritta in questo grandissimo libro che continuamente ci sta 
aperto dinanzi agli occhi (io dico l’universo), ma non si può intendere se prima non s’impara a 
intender la lingua, e conoscere i caratteri ne’ quali è scritto. Egli è scritto in lingua matematica, e i 
caratteri son triangoli, cerchi, ed altre figure geometriche, senza i quali mezzi è impossibile a 
intenderne umanamente parola ... .” Here I am developing an interpretation of this passage put 
forward in Ginzburg, “Spie: radici di un paradigma indiziario”, 172–173, and in Ginzburg, “Clues: 
Roots of an Evidential Paradigm”, especially 107–108. 
4 Freedberg, The Eye of  the Lynx: Galileo, His Friends, and the Beginnings of  Modern Natural History. 
5 Ginzburg, “Spuren einer Paradigmengabelung: Machiavelli, Galilei und die Zensur der 
Gegenreformation”. 
6 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 158; Bloch, “Apologie pour l’histoire”, 959. 
7 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 173; “... il fomente l’anachronisme: entre tous les péchés, au regard d’une 
science du temps, le plus impardonnable ...”; Bloch, “Apologie pour l’histoire”, 969. 
8 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 176–177; Bloch, “Apologie pour l’histoire”, 971. 
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positivism’s classical texts, Claude Bernard’s Introduction à la médecine expérimentale 
(1865) – a book which Bloch mentioned with some disagreement – had noted, in a 
paragraph entitled “Experimental criticism must look at facts, not at words,” that 
ambiguity also threatens science’s conventional languages: 
When we create a word to characterize a phenomenon, we then agree in general on 
the idea that we wish it to express and the precise meaning we are giving to it; but with 
the later progress of  science the meaning of  the word changes for some people, while 
for others the word remains in the language with its original meaning. The result is 
often such discord that men using the same word express very different ideas. Our 
language, in fact, is only approximate, and even in science it is so indefinite that if  we 
lose sight of  phenomena and cling to words, we are speedily outside of  reality.9 
3. But what is, from the historian’s perspective, the relationship between words – 
the words from the evidence – and reality? In Bloch’s answer to this question one 
may detect many intertwined elements. First of  all, a sense of  the inadequacy of  
words vis-à-vis what generates them: passions, feelings, thoughts, needs. Bloch 
exemplifies this inadequacy by evoking an extreme case: 
How instructive it would be – whether as to the God of  yesterday or today – were we 
able to hear the true prayers on the lips of  the humble! Assuming, of  course, that they 
themselves knew how to express the impulses of  their hearts without mutilating them. 
For there, in the final analysis, lies the greatest obstacle. Nothing is more difficult for 
us than self-expression (...) The most usual terms are never more than 
approximations.10 
These words, based on Bloch’s personal research experience, were not inspired by 
skepticism – quite the contrary. The awareness of  any word’s inadequacy, whether 
written or told, had suggested indirect strategies to Bloch that enabled him to read 
medieval sources against the grain. One may recall the magnificent pages of  Les rois 
thaumaturges dedicated to men and women affected by scrophula, who traveled 
enormous distances yearning for the miraculous touch of  the royal hand.11 But the 
same awareness had reinforced his commitment to a comparative history based, as in 
the case of  Les Rois thaumaturges, on categories and terms inevitably distant from 
those used in the evidence. 
                                                 
9 Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of  Experimental Medicine, 188; “Quand on crée un mot pour 
caractériser un phénomène, on s’entend en général à ce moment sur l’idée qu’on veut lui faire 
exprimer et sur la signification exacte qu’on lui donne, mais plus tard, par le progrès de la science, le 
sens du mot change pour les uns, tandis que pour les autres le mot reste dans le langage avec sa 
signification primitive. Il en résulte alors une discordance qui, souvent, est telle, que des hommes, en 
employant le même mot, expriment des idées très différentes. Notre langage n’est en effet 
qu’approximatif, et il est si peu précis, même dans les sciences, que, si l’on perd les phénomènes de 
vue, pour s’attacher aux mots, on est bien vite en dehors de la réalité.” Bernard, Introduction à l’étude de 
la médecine expérimentale, 330–331. Bloch referred to Claude Bernard’s Introduction in “Apologie pour 
l’histoire”, 831, 908. 
10 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 166–167 (translation slightly modified); “Quel enseignement si – le le 
dieu fût-il d’hier ou d’aujourd’hui – nous réussissions à atteindre sur les lèvres des humbles leur 
véritable prière! A supposer, cependant, qu’il aient su, eux-mêmes, traduire, sans le mutiler, les élans de 
leur coeur. Car là est, en dernier ressort, le grand obstacle. Rien n’est plus difficile à un homme que de 
s’exprimer soi-même. (…) Les termes les plus usuels ne sont jamais que des approximations.” Bloch, 
“Apologie pour l’histoire”, 965. 
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4. These elements come to the fore in the 1928 essay titled “Pour une histoire 
comparée des sociétés européennes:” a kind of  methodological manifesto, which is 
still an indispensable point of  reference.12 In the conclusion to his essay Bloch 
evoked the lasting prejudice which identifies comparative history with a search for 
analogies, including the most superficial. The whole point of  comparative history, 
Bloch insisted, is to emphasize the specific differences between the phenomena it deals 
with. For this purpose, one has to cast aside all false resemblances: for instance, in 
the domain of  the European Middle Ages, the alleged equivalence between English 
villainage and French servage. True, some intersections are undeniable: 
Serf and villain are both considered, by jurists and by general opinion, as individuals 
devoid of  ‘liberty’: therefore in some Latin texts they are labelled servi... Hence men of  
learning, starting from the absence of  liberty and the reference to servitude, were led 
to compare them to Roman slaves. 
But this, according to Bloch, is a 
superficial analogy: the concept of  non-liberty, as far as its content is concerned, 
underwent many variations at different times and places.13  
To sum up: we have two different geographic contexts, the English and the 
French, and two different words, villain and serf. Medieval jurists and men of  learning 
routinely conflated them with servi, the term for Roman slaves, since villains, serfs 
and servi were assumed to have been deprived of  their liberty. Bloch rejected this 
conclusion as superficial, on the grounds of  an argument put forward by a number 
of  scholars, including Paul Vinogradoff, the great Anglo-Russian medievalist: 
meaning, that in 1300 or so villains had joined the category “free tenants” in England; 
in France in the same period tenants were sharply distinguished from serfs. Bloch 
traced these divergent historical trajectories, concluding: 
In the fourteenth century, the French serf and the English villain belong to two 
completely different classes. Is it helpful to compare them? Certainly, but this 
comparison will end by fleshing out quite different features, suggesting a remarkable 
disjuncture in the development of  the two nations.14 
Here, as in other passages from the same essay, Bloch used the word “classes” 
(classes) to identify two different social realities erroneously conflated by medieval 
jurists. But his comment on the norms assumed by English jurists, which ascribed a 
lesser degree of  freedom to those individuals who had to perform heavy agricultural 
tasks (corvées), headed in a different direction. “Those norms,” Bloch wrote, “were far 
from original. They simply relied upon a layer of  collective representations, 
elaborated much earlier, helter-skelter, within medieval societies both on the 
Continent and in the British Isles. The idea that agricultural work is in some way 
intrinsically incompatible with liberty springs from ancient mental habits, exemplified 
by the words opera servilia, applied by barbarians to this kind of  work.”15 Abandoning 
the domain of  documented terminology, Bloch abruptly shifted to a more slippery, 
                                                 
12 Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes”. 
13 Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes”, 28. 
14 Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes”, 30. 
15 Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes”, 31. 
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hypothetical ground: “collective representations.” This notion is taken from 
Durkheim, whose name received special emphasis in a footnote. In a previous 
passage Bloch had alluded to “an old, largely forgotten legacy of  popular 
representations.”16 
Liberty and servitude in the Middle Ages, seen in a longer chronological 
perspective, surfaced again a few years later in another essay by Bloch. In some cases 
the juridical terms referring to servitude did not change: but their meaning (Bloch 
remarked) underwent imperceptible variations over time, as the Carolingian 
documents show. They display a series of  shifts, “obviously unconscious,” which 
must be assessed for what they are: likewise, linguists have pointed out that at a 
certain moment the word labourer took on the meaning of  the Latin word arare, to 
plough.17 Following the example of  linguists, Bloch wrote, historians should refrain 
from replacing interpretations given in the past with their own.18 
This is a somewhat unexpected statement. In a passage of  his previous essay 
Bloch had rejected the unfounded assimilation of  medieval servitude to ancient 
slavery, inspired by the Latin word servi. Nonetheless, one might argue that 
reconstructing the jurists’ perspectives and emphasizing their limitations are not 
incompatible aims. There is more. The essay in which Bloch urged historians to take 
linguists as a model is entitled “Personal Liberty and Personal Servitude in the 
Middle Ages, Particularly in France: A Contribution to the Analysis of  Classes” 
(Liberté et servitude personnelles au Moyen âge, particulièrement en France: contribution à l’étude 
des classes, 1933). For Bloch, “class,” a modern category, far from effacing the 
categories put forward by medieval jurists, inscribed them in a perspective which is 
ours, not theirs. This point is emphasized in the final passages of  the essay: 
Everything brings us to the same conclusion. Since human institutions are realities of  
a psychological sort, a class never exists except inasmuch as we perceive it. To write 
the history of  servitude means above all to trace, in the complex, changing trajectory 
of  its development, the history of  a collective notion: the deprivation of  liberty.19 
Needless to say, the psychological interpretation of  class put forward by Bloch 
can be accepted, debated, or rejected on the grounds of  different analytic categories. 
But his reflections elicit a more general question: what is the relationship between the 
observer’s and the actor’s categories, retrieved from medieval documents? Another 
question immediately follows. The medieval jurists were observers and actors at the 
same time. What is the relationship between the representation of  servitude shared 
by jurists and the representation of  servitude shared by servants? 
5. This last question, which Bloch does not explicitly raise, emerges irresistibly 
                                                 
16 Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes”, 30 n. 1, 29 n. 2. 
17 Bloch, “Liberté et servitude personnelles au Moyen âge”, especially 332. 
18 Bloch, “Liberté et servitude personelles au Moyen âge”, 327–328. 
19 Bloch, “Liberté et servitude personelles au Moyen âge”, 355: “Ainsi nous nous trouvons ramenés de 
toutes parts à la même leçon. Les institutions humaines étant des réalités d’ordre psychologique, une 
classe n’existe jamais que par l’idée qu’on s’en fait. Ecrire l’histoire de la condition servile, c’est, avant 
tout, retracer, dans la courbe complexe et changeante de son développement, l’histoire d’une notion 
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from his own research. At this point I must make a personal digression. Reading Les 
Rois thaumaturges in 1959, when I was twenty, convinced me to try to learn the 
historian’s craft. A few months later I decided to commit myself  to the study of  
witchcraft trials, focusing on the men and women who stood before the judges rather 
than on the persecution as such. Nudging me in that direction were some books 
(Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, Carlo Levi’s Christ Stopped at Eboli, Ernesto de 
Martino’s Il mondo magico) as well as poignant memories of  racial persecution. But 
only many years later did I become aware that my experience as a Jewish child during 
the war had led me to identify with the men and women accused of  witchcraft.20 
Following the advice of  my mentor, Delio Cantimori, I began to study the 
Inquisition trials (many of  them dealing with witchcraft or related crimes) preserved 
in the State Archive of  Modena. Then I extended my research to other archives – a 
quite erratic journey, as I had no specific agenda. In the early nineteen sixties, reading 
through the Inquisition trial records preserved in the State Archive of  Venice, I came 
across a document which was, as I immediately realized, a complete anomaly: a few 
pages, dated 1591, recording the examination of  Menichino della Nota, a young 
herdsman from Friuli. Menichino replied to the inquisitor’s questions saying that he 
was a benandante. The meaning of  this word was unknown to me – and to the 
inquisitor as well, who apparently listened in astonishment to the defendant’s story. 
Since he had been born with a caul, Menichino said, he was compelled to leave his 
body three times a year, “like smoke,” traveling with the other benandanti to fight 
“for the faith against the witches” in the Josaphat meadow. “When the benandanti 
won,” he concluded, “it was a sign of  a good harvest.”21 
Many years ago I put forward a retrospective analysis of  my reactions to that 
document which I had come across by pure chance: the first of  nearly fifty trials that 
I later discovered in the Ecclesiastical Archive of  Udine. All of  them hinge upon a 
word – benandante – which elicited questions from the inquisitors; the answers 
provided by the defendants were filled with extraordinary details. The trials show that 
the inquisitors soon made up their minds: the benandanti, who claimed that their 
spirits fought against witches and sorcerers, were in fact themselves sorcerers. These 
accusations provoked indignant denials from the benandanti, who insisted on 
describing their “profession” (as they called it) sometimes with pride, sometimes as 
the result of  an obscure, inescapable drive. But ultimately, after fifty years of  
investigations, those who believed they had been fighting on the side of  good 
accepted the hostile image their interrogators had constructed. This was the outcome 
of  a cultural clash impregnated with violence – in this case, mostly symbolic. The 
inquisitors’ prestige, as well as the impending threat of  torture and death at the stake, 
had proven ineluctable. 
In a book I published in 1966, translated into English as The Night Battles, I 
analyzed the tales provided by the benandanti as a fragment of  peasant culture, 
slowly distorted by the imposition of  inquisitorial stereotypes. This argument was 
based on the heated disagreements between defendants and inquisitors over the 
                                                 
20 Ginzburg, “Streghe e sciamani”. 
21 Ginzburg, I benandanti, 84–87; Ginzburg, The Night Battles: Witchcraft and Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries, 74–77. 
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actual meaning of  the word benandante. What made the extraordinary Friulian 
evidence so valuable for the historian was the very lack of  communication between 
two sides engaged in a dramatically unequal dialogue. 
After a break that lasted many years I resumed my work on witchcraft trials. At 
that time I realized that my approach to the judges, both lay and ecclesiastical, had 
been in many ways inadequate. Their behavior was sometimes marked by a genuine 
attempt to make sense of  the defendants’ beliefs and acts – in order to eradicate 
them, of  course. Cultural distance could generate an effort to understand, to 
compare, to translate. Let me recall an extreme but enlightening case. In 1453 the 
bishop of  Brixen – the philosopher Nicholas of  Cusa – listened to the tales told by 
two old women from a nearby valley. In a sermon delivered some time later he 
described them as being “half  crazy” (semideliras). They had paid homage to a 
nocturnal goddess they called “Richella” (from “ricchezza”, translatable as ‘richness’). 
The learned bishop identified Richella with Diana, Abundia, Satia: names mentioned 
in those sections of  medieval encyclopedias and treatises on canon law dealing with 
popular superstitions.22 This hermeneutic attempt was not exceptional. Less 
illustrious judges and inquisitors drew up summaries and translations which, 
contained in a series of  nested Chinese boxes, are available to the modern interpreter 
– in this case, myself. With some embarrassment I discovered, apart from my 
emotional identification with the victims, a troubling intellectual contiguity with the 
persecutors: a condition that I sought to analyze in an essay titled “The Inquisitor as 
Anthropologist.”23 
6. I cannot imagine which direction my research – first of  all, the one I did in the 
Frulian archives – would have taken had I never come across Bloch’s writings. In 
hindsight, I am tempted to compare the benandanti’s ecstatic dreams to the “true 
prayers” of  the humble evoked by Bloch: inner experiences that words (documented 
in the former case, imagined in the latter) record in an inevitably inadequate manner. 
In the case of  benandanti we are faced with words uttered at the inquisitor’s behest, 
and then transcribed by the inquisitor’s notaries: a conflictual context (albeit ruled by 
law) which must be taken into account, yet one that does not make the evidence any 
the less relevant. 
I am inclined to believe that no historian would have missed such a blatant 
conflict. Much less obvious, in my view, was the perception, which I realized only 
many years later, of  my contiguity with the inquisitors. Perhaps this contiguity 
imposed itself  upon my mind only when I grew aware of  the deep roots behind the 
preliminary choice that had shaped my research project from its very outset. 
Emotional identification with the victims, intellectual contiguity with the 
inquisitors: we are far removed from the elements which, in the model of  historical 
research described by Bloch, look closer to positivism. In his reflections on 
nomenclature, conflict appears only on the actor’s side: for instance, in his remarks 
on a comparatively late phenomenon like class consciousness, either of  the twentieth 
                                                 
22 Ginzburg, Storia notturna. Una decifrazione del sabba, 70–73, 107–108; Ginzburg, Ecstasies: Deciphering the 
Witches’s Sabbath, 94–96. 
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century workers, or of  the peasants on the eve of  French revolution.24 But on the 
side of  the observer-historian’s language, which Bloch would have wished to 
conform, as much as possible, to the neutral and detached language of  the natural 
sciences, conflict is never mentioned. 
In the perspective I am advocating, a critical, detached attitude can be a goal, not a 
starting point. Although the end is not unlike Bloch’s, the roads leading to it are. In 
the light of  the risky contiguity between the historian’s language and the language of  
evidence, the sterilization of  the instruments of  analysis is more urgent than ever – 
especially in cases that display a contiguity between observer and observers-actors 
(the inquisitor as anthropologist, the inquisitor as historian). 
7. These retrospective reflections on the research I carried out in the Friulian 
archives in the nineteen sixties and seventies are partly inspired by my later encounter 
with the writings of  Kenneth L. Pike. Pike, the American linguist, anthropologist, 
and missionary, emphasized the opposition between two levels of  analysis, the 
observer’s and the actor’s, labeled, respectively, as etic (from phonetic) and emic (from 
phonemic). Starting from language, Pike set up a unified theory of  the structure of  
human behavior – the title of  his most ambitious work, first published in three parts 
between 1954 and 1960, and then reprinted, in a revised and expanded version, in 
1967. 
The etic point of  view, Pike explained, examines languages and cultures in a 
comparative perspective; the emic point of  view is “culturally specific, applied to one 
language or culture at a time.”25 But this static, and rather perplexing, opposition is 
subsequently reworked into a more effective dynamic perspective: 
Preliminary versus final presentation: Hence, etic data provide access into the system – 
the starting point of  analysis. They give tentative results, tentative units. The final 
analysis or presentation, however, would be in emic units. In the total analysis, the 
initial etic description gradually is refined, and is ultimately – in principle, but probably 
never in practice – replaced by one which is totally emic.26  
Most historians, familiar with Bloch’s nuanced and sophisticated reflections, 
would react with some impatience to these remarks, deeming them to be exceedingly 
abstract. True, Pike was addressing himself  not to historians but to linguists and 
anthropologists.27 For a long time those two groups have been dealing with the 
                                                 
24 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 167; Bloch, “Apologie pour l’histoire”, 96. 
25 An echo of  this definition in Subrahmanyam, “Monsieur Picart and the Gentiles of  India”, 
especially 206: etic, i.e. “universalist” vs. emic, i.e. “internalist”. 
26 Pike, Kenneth L. Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of  the Structure of  Human Behavior, 37–39. The 
last sentence of  this passage is quoted (with disagreement) in Harris, Marvin. “History and 
Significance” 329–350, which ends with a criticism of  Claude Lévi-Strauss’s attitude, labelled as 
“obscurantist” and inspired by Berkeley’s idealism. Lévi-Strauss, whose huge four-volumes work 
Mythologiques (1964–1971) had just come out, had dismissed the distinction claiming that etics is 
“nothing but the emics of  the observers.” Lévi-Strauss, “Structuralisme et écologie”, 143–166, above 
all 161–162. Helpful remarks (which strangely enough do not mention Lévi-Strauss’s essay) in Olivier 
de Sardan, Jean Pierre. “Emique”, 151–166 (many thanks to Simona Cerutti for having brought this 
piece to my attention). My own disagreement with Harris and (at an incomparably higher level) with 
Lévi-Strauss will emerge from what follows. 
27 “I am not a historical linguist,” Pike wrote in “On the Emics and Etics of  Pike and Harris”, 40. 
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distinction between emic and etic levels; historians, on the contrary, have ignored it, 
with few exceptions. (I myself  became aware of  the emic/etic divide twenty years ago, 
which was twenty years after the publication of  Pike’s magnum opus.)28 But it might 
not be pointless to attempt a translation of  the aforementioned passage, using words 
associated with historical research. The result might sound like this: “Historians start 
from questions using terms that are inevitably anachronistic. The research process 
modifies the initial questions on the grounds of  new evidence, retrieving answers 
that are articulated in the actors’ language, and related to categories peculiar to their 
society, which is utterly different from ours.” 
My translation of  the “tentative results” generated by the etic perspective – 
“Historians start from questions using terms that are inevitably anachronistic” – 
echoes a remark made by Bloch.29 Questions, not answers: a distinction which has 
been missed by those who either carelessly emphasized the role of  anachronism in 
historical research, or dismissed anachronism altogether as a pertinent category.30 
One starts from etic questions aiming to get emic answers.31 
We may compare my tentative translation with one of  the rules of  the decalogue 
that Arnaldo Momigliano proposed many years ago titled “The Rules of  the Game in 
the Study of  Ancient History.” The rule applies to the history of  any period: 
As soon as we enter the field of  historical research, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Marx, 
Weber, Jung, and Braudel teach us to subject the evidence to specific questions; they 
do not affect the answers that the evidence provides. The historian’s arbitrary will 
vanishes as soon as he has to interpret a document.32  
In my view Pike’s passage, my translation of  it, and Momigliano’s rule do not 
differ significantly. What I regard as a divergence lies elsewhere. The residual etic 
element which, according to Pike, cannot be erased, should be seen in positive terms: 
as an intrinsic element of  the translation activity which is, etymologically, 
synonymous with interpretation. The tension between our questions and the answers 
we get from the evidence must be kept alive, although the evidence may well modify 
our initial questions.33 If  the difference between our words and theirs is carefully 
                                                 
28 [Ginzburg], “Saccheggi rituali. Premesse a una ricerca in corso”. A relevant exception is Simona 
Cerutti, “Microhistory: Social Relations versus Cultural Models?” (see my comment, footnote 31). 
29 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 158; “Les documents tendent à imposer leur nomenclature; l’historien, 
s’il les écoute, écrit sous la dictée d’une époque chaque fois différente. Mais il pense, d’autre part, 
naturellement selon les catégories de son propre temps …” Bloch, “Apologie pour l’histoire”, 959–
960. 
30 See, respectively, Loraux, “Eloge de l’anachronisme en histoire”; Didi-Huberman, Devant le temps: 
Histoire de l’art et anachronisme des images; Rancière, “Le concept d’anachronisme et la vérité de 
l’historien”, 53–68.  
31 “Emic is a method of  analysis, not the immediate context of  behavior,” S. Cerutti wrote, criticizing my 
own approach (Cerutti, “Microhistory”, 35; italics in the text). But in my view the emic perspective can 
be grasped only through the mediation of  an etic perspective: hence the active role (which Cerutti 
finds arbitrary: ibid., 34), played by the researcher in the research process. 
32 Momigliano, “Le regole del gioco nello studio della storia antica”, 483. 
33 Curiously, the revision of  the initial questions is missing in Clifford Geertz’s version of  the 
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preserved, it will prevent us from falling into two traps – empathy and 
ventriloquism.34 These are indeed related: by assuming the transparency of  the actors 
we ascribe to them our language and our categories. The result is an insidious 
distortion, which is much more dangerous (because more difficult to pinpoint) than 
grossly anachronistic assumptions such as homo oeconomicus and the like. 
The Latin word interpres reminds us that any interpretation is a translation, and 
vice versa. Translation surfaces in the debates inspired by Pike’s arguments. A group 
of  reactions was published in a book entitled Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider 
Debate, based on a conference held in Phoenix in 1988. One of  the participants, 
Willard Quine, the philosopher famous for his reflections on “radical translation,” 
ended his lecture as follows: 
And yet there remains, between outside and inside, a vital asymmetry. Our provisional 
but responsible commitment to our science extends to what we say about the exotic 
culture, and does not extend to what the insiders say within it.35 
The asymmetry between our words and theirs, emphasized by Quine (and by Pike 
before him), has been experienced by historians as well: as the saying goes, “The past 
is a foreign country.”36 It is not surprising, after all, that such an asymmetry was 
articulated and theorized by an anthropologist. The distance, both linguistic and 
cultural, which usually separates anthropologists from the so-called “natives” 
prevents the former from assuming, as historians so often do, that they have become 
the intimates of  the characters they are dealing with. As I pointed out before, 
ventriloquism is a professional illness many historians succumb to. But not all of  
them, obviously. 
Somebody once spoke of  an emic anthropology, specifically committed to rescuing 
“the native’s point of  view,” as Malinowski put it.37 By analogy, one could speak of  
an emic historiography. Three splendid examples will suffice: Paul Oskar Kristeller’s 
and Augusto Campana’s essays on the origins of  the word “humanista” and Ernst 
Gombrich’s little known lecture on the Renaissance as a period and as a movement.38 
All three attempt to reconstruct the actors’ categories as distinct from the observers’ 
categories – the latter categories often inform the thinking of  a group that extends 
far beyond the circle of  professional historians. At the end of  his essay Campana 
remarked that recently (this was written in 1946) somebody had spoken of  “a new 
humanism: and the old word has been impregnated with new ideals. Future 
philologists and historians will deal with them.” But in a postscript published the 
following year, Campana used stronger words: he believed that Kristeller, in the essay 
he had written independently on the same subject, had demonstrated that the 
                                                 
34 Only after having written these pages I realized that the same metaphor has been used in Daston 
and Galison, Objectivity, 257: “to ventriloquize nature,” (but the entire context is relevant). 
35 Quine, “The Phoneme’s Long Shadow”, 167. 
36 Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country. 
37 Feleppa, “Emic Analysis and the Limits of  Cognitive Diversity”, 101 ff. 
38 Kristeller, “Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance” (see also introduction, XI–
XII); Campana, “The Origin of  the Word ‘Humanist’”; Dionisotti, “Ancora humanista-umanista”; 
Gombrich, “The Renaissance: Period or Movement”. 
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modern concept of  “Renaissance humanism ... is untenable.”39 Untenable, of  course, 
from a philological point of  view. This does not prevent us from using categories like 
“Renaissance” (as Campana himself  subsequently did).40 But we must always be 
aware that however useful they may be, such labels remain conventional. Those who 
make such efforts to uncover the intrinsic features of  humanism, the Renaissance, 
modernity, the twentieth century, are – to put it mildly – wasting their time. 
8. The emic dimension which I proposed, by way of  experiment, to find in 
historiography, can be described using more ancient and more familiar words: 
philology, antiquarianism. (Anthropology was born from antiquarianism, so the circle 
is closed.) But a mechanical transfer of  the opposition between emic and etic into the 
historiographic discourse would be misleading. Drawing on their own practice, 
historians might point out that the emic/etic dichotomy is somewhat simplistic. As my 
Friulian case shows, both the emic and the etic dimension are theatres of  conflicts: 
between inquisitors and benandanti (in the former case), between scholars of  varying 
orientations (in the latter). But becoming aware of  the emic/etic distinction may help 
historians to free themselves from an ethnocentric bias: a task which is becoming 
more urgent in a world shaped by globalization – a process that has been going on 
for centuries, but has taken on a truly frantic pace in the last decades. 
Historians must meet this challenge – but the question is how? An answer has 
been offered by debates over literary texts. One can start from Erich Auerbach’s 
“Philology of  World Literature [Weltliteratur]”: a famous essay that appeared in 1952, 
and that today has an almost prophetic ring to it.41 
A gloomy prophecy. In the middle of  the Cold War Auerbach saw a widespread 
tendency towards cultural homogeneity: a phenomenon which, notwithstanding the 
obvious differences, affected both blocs. The world was becoming more alike; even 
nation states, which had been in the past agents of  cultural differentiation, had lost 
part of  their power. Mass culture (a term Auerbach did not use: but this was the gist 
of  his analysis) was spreading across the entire surface of  the globe. A Weltliteratur 
was emerging, in a context completely different from the one imagined by Goethe: a 
world literature in which Europe had a marginal role. Faced with this enormous 
expansion in space and time, even a wide-ranging scholar like Auerbach sensed the 
inadequacy of  his instruments. So he gave young literary scholars some advice, both 
negative and positive. On the one hand, he suggested that they should avoid both 
general concepts like Renaissance or Baroque and a monographic approach based on 
the oeuvre of  a single author. On the other, he recommended that they should look 
for specific details that might serve as connecting points (Ansatzpunkte). 
Auerbach was alluding to the method which had inspired his great book, Mimesis. 
But in 1952 the reflections he had put forward less than a decade before, in the 
concluding section of  Mimesis, were developed in a different direction. If  the 
relevance of  the European literary tradition could not be taken for granted any more, 
the issue of  generalization came to the forefront, albeit implicitly. Generalization – 
                                                 
39 Campana, “The Origin of  the Word ‘Humanist’”, 280–281. 
40 Campana, “The Origin of  the Word ‘Humanist’”, 405. 
41 Auerbach, “Philologie der Weltliteratur”. See also the introduction: Salvaneschi and Endrighi, “La 
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but starting from where, and for what purpose? 
A few years ago, in an essay entitled “Conjectures on World Literature” (which 
curiously enough does not mention Auerbach), Franco Moretti bravely addressed 
those issues.42 Faced with the challenge provided by an enormous number of  texts 
which no scholar working on comparative literature could ever master, Moretti 
suggested a drastic solution: second-hand reading. Scholars committed to a 
comparative approach to literature would raise general questions by absorbing the 
insights of  scholars who had been working in a more circumscribed perspective, 
devoted to a specific national literature. Therefore, the comparative study of  
literature would be based not on close reading but on distant reading. This proposal, 
put forward in a deliberately provocative tone, was framed by an argument based on 
the Marc Bloch essay I had started from: “Toward a Comparative History of  
European Societies.” A comparison between the two relevant passages – first 
Moretti’s, then, in translation, Bloch’s – will be helpful. Here is Moretti: 
Writing about comparative social history, Marc Bloch once coined a lovely ‘slogan,’ as 
he himself  called it: ‘years of  analysis for a day of  synthesis’; and if  you read Braudel 
or Wallerstein you immediately see what Bloch had in mind. The text which is strictly 
Wallerstein’s, his ‘day of  synthesis,’ occupies one third of  a page, one fourth, maybe 
half; the rest are quotations (fourteen hundred, in the first volume of  The Modern 
World-System). Years of  analysis; other people’s analysis, which Wallerstein’s page 
synthesizes into a system.43  
“The old dictum is always true: years of  analysis for a day of  synthesis,” Bloch 
wrote. He was referring to a passage from Fustel de Coulanges’s introduction to his 
La Gaule romaine, published in 1875. In a footnote Bloch provided the exact 
quotation: “For a day of  synthesis, years of  analysis are needed.” No reassessment of  
the dictum’s inventor is as important as Bloch’s subsequent comment: 
Too often this dictum has been quoted without adding its indispensable correction: 
the ‘analysis’ can be used for the ‘synthesis’ only if  it takes the latter into account and 
tries to put itself  at its service from the beginning.44 
Bloch’s qualification points in the opposite direction from Moretti’s reading.45 One 
should not, as positivists think, accumulate bricks, that is monographic research, for a 
building that exists only in the mind of  the architect (or of  the professor of  
comparative literature). Evidence must be collected according to an agenda which is 
already pointing towards a synthetic approach. In other words, one has to work out 
cases, which will lead to generalizations. But since most evidence has been collected, 
filtered or approached by previous scholars, who started from questions different 
from ours, the history of  historiography must be incorporated within historical 
research. The greater our distance from the primary evidence is, the greater the risk 
of  being caught out by hypotheses put forward either by intermediaries or by 
                                                 
42 Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature”; Arac, “Anglo-Globalism?” suggests a parallel reading 
of  Moretti’s and Auerbach’s essays. 
43 Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature”, 56–57. 
44 Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes”, 38. 
45 Bloch’s passage is quoted first-hand (without the qualification which follows immediately) in 
Moretti, Il romanzo di formazione, “Prefazione 1999”. 
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ourselves actually becomes. In other words, we risk finding what we are looking for – 
and nothing else. 
That distorted reading of  Bloch’s passage is especially surprising, since Moretti 
himself, in a brilliant essay, published simultaneously with “Conjectures on World 
Literature,” shows that the only way to meet the challenge stemming from the 
enormous, and unmasterable, mass of  published and forgotten texts, is to work on a 
case study: a first-hand analysis of  a limited series of  texts, identified by way of  a 
specific question. This second essay, entitled “The Slaughterhouse of  Literature” (an 
allusion to an aphorism of  Hegel), deals with a literary device which Conan Doyle 
put, almost unwittingly, at the heart of  his detective stories: clues.46 Many years ago I 
wrote an essay entitled “Clues” that deals with Sherlock Holmes and other topics in 
quite a different perspective.47 
If  I am not mistaken, both essays, Franco Moretti’s and mine, imply the device 
known as mise en abyme: since clues, as a topic, are analyzed by means of  an approach 
based on clues, the details replicate the whole.48 But clues require first-hand reading: 
the person responsible for the final synthesis cannot delegate this task to others. 
Moreover, a close, analytic reading is compatible with an enormous amount of  
evidence. Those familiar with archival research know that one can go on leafing 
through innumerable files and quickly inspecting the contents of  countless boxes 
before coming to a sudden halt, arrested by a document which could be scrutinized 
for years. Likewise, a chicken (I hope that nobody will be upset by such a 
comparison) walks back and forth, glancing around, before abruptly snatching up a 
worm until then concealed in the ground. Once again we come back to Ansatzpunkte: 
the specific points which, as Auerbach argued, can provide the seeds for a detailed 
research program provided with a generalizing potential – in other words, a case. 
Anomalous cases are especially promising, since anomalies, as Kierkegaard once 
noted, are richer, from a cognitive point of  view, than norms, insofar as the former 
invariably includes the latter – but not the other way round.49 
9. For a certain number of  years cases have been the object of  growing attention, 
partially related to ongoing debates about microhistory: a term whose prefix – micro 
– alludes, as has been repeatedly emphasized (but never enough, perhaps) to the 
microscope, to the analytic gaze, not to the dimensions, alleged or real, of  the object 
under scrutiny.50 Yet microhistory, based on analytic (and thus first-hand) research, 
aims at generalization: a word which is usually, and wrongfully, taken for granted. 
Further reflection is needed to explore the wide range of  its varieties, based on 
different starting points (questions or answers) different kinds of  analogy 
                                                 
46 Moretti, “The Slaughterhouse of  Literature”. 
47 Ginzburg, “Spie: radici di un paradigma indiziario”; Ginzburg, “Clues: Roots of  an Indiciary 
Paradigm”. 
48 Dällenbach, Le récit spéculaire: essai sur la mise en abyme. 
49 Cf. Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, 33, referring to an unnamed 
“Protestan theologian.” Many thanks to Henrique Espada Lima who made me aware of  the source of  
this remark, which I had unknowingly made my own. 
50 The best introduction to the subject is still the chapter “Kasus” in Jolles, Einfache Formen. See also 
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(metonymic, metaphoric) and so forth.51 
One could object that in a globalized world there is no room for microhistory. I 
would argue the opposite. The international reception of  microhistory can be easily 
interpreted in a political perspective. The first wave of  interest in microhistory, after 
its birth in Italy, manifested itself  in Germany, France, England, the United States. It 
has been followed by a second wave, related to peripheries or semi-peripheries: 
Finland, South Korea, Iceland.52 Microhistory has provided an opportunity to 
subvert pre-existing hierarchies thanks to the intrinsic relevance – demonstrated a 
posteriori – of  the object under scrutiny. This is completely different from what has 
been labeled “Anglo-globalism:” the unintentionally imperialistic privileging of  
studies in comparative literature written in English, based on studies mostly written 
in English, dealing with literary texts mostly written in languages other than 
English.53 
Relying on microhistory to subvert political and historiographic hierarchies sinks 
its roots in the distant past. It is not Tribe X which is relevant, Malinowski once said, 
but the questions addressed to Tribe X. In a similar spirit, Marc Bloch argued that 
local history must be addressed through questions bearing general implications. In 
the light of  what I have been saying so far, the convergence between anthropology 
and history will seem obvious. In a world like ours, in which some historians, reacting 
against the pseudo-universality of  Mircea Eliade’s Homo religiosus, emphasized the 
ethnocentric dimension, Roman and Christian, of  the word “religion,” case studies 
related to specific contexts look promising, as they allow for new generalizations, 
generating new questions and new research.54 Emic answers generate etic questions, 
and vice versa.  
I did not want to end my reflections by singing the praises of  microhistory. I am 
not interested in labels; bad microhistory is bad history. No method can protect us 
from our limitations and our mistakes. When we speak to the next generation we 
must be frank in admitting our shortcomings, while describing what, against all odds, 
we had been trying to do. The next generation will listen to us and will do something 
different, as has always happened. “Tristo è lo discepolo che non avanza il suo maestro” 
(“Poor is the pupil who does not surpass his master”) Leonardo said. 
                                                 
51 Jakobson, “Due aspetti del linguaggio e due tipi di afasia”. Much help will come from Melandri, La 
linea e il circolo: Studio logico-filosofico sull’analogia. 
52 Some bibliographical references: Chasob, ed., Mishisa ran muoshinga; Ginzburg, Ólafsson and 
Magnússon, Molar og mygla: Um einsögu og glataðan tíma; Magnússon, “The Singularization of  History: 
Social history and Microhistory within the Postmodern State of  Knowledge; Muir and Ruggiero, eds. 
Microhistory and the Lost People of  Europe; Peltonen, “Carlo Ginzburg and the New Microhistory”; 
Peltonen, “Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in Historical Research”; Revel, ed. 
Jeux d’échelles: la micro-analyse à l’expérience. 
53 This criticism has been raised by Arac, “Anglo-Globalism?” In his answer Moretti does not address 
this issue: cf. Moretti, “More Conjectures”, (note 8 deals with the language used by the critics, not 
with the second-hand or third-hand approach to translated texts supposedly performed by the meta-
critic working in a comparative perspective). 
54 Momigliano, “Questioni di metodologia della storia delle religioni”; Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in 
the Study of  Religion. 
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